SESSION FOUR
International Negotiation
Citizen Diplomacy

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Abstract

Citizen, or Track Two diplomacy, is the nongovernmental, informal and unofficial action by private citizens in such international issues as conflict resolution and prevention, and environmental policies. Track Two diplomacy acts as a supplement to Track One diplomacy, which includes all the governmental, official, and formal activities that occur daily in the international diplomatic arena. As a supplement to official diplomacy, citizen diplomacy has the same broad goals of establishing peace and finding solutions to global problems. However, as its name implies, citizen diplomacy focuses on creating understanding and cooperation among people of different nations through direct, personal contact. It also attempts to change the thinking of Track One since, ultimately, treaties and other official interactions can only occur between governments. During the past three decades, interactions between private citizens from various countries have created positive changes in the areas of nuclear disarmament, the Middle East situation, terrorism and U.S.-Soviet relations, showing that individuals have power, and groups of individuals have even more power to bring about a peaceful world.
Citizen diplomacy, or Track Two diplomacy, is about how citizens as private individuals can make a difference in world affairs. Some specific examples show how individuals and very small groups, through their own dynamism and through their own leadership, can take on a government and actually bring about a change in national policy, something that is very difficult to do.

Let us start with two definitions. Track One diplomacy is basically what diplomats do every day of their career. It is government-to-government interaction. It is official, formal, structured, and often rigid. It is interaction between instructed representatives of sovereign nations. Track Two diplomacy is something totally different. It is nongovernmental, citizen-to-citizen, unofficial, informal. It is uninstructed interaction between citizens acting on their own.

Track Two diplomacy has two broad objectives. First of all, it aims to reduce conflict between groups and nations by improving communication and understanding. It tries to lower anger, tension, fear, and misunderstanding. It tries to humanize the face of the enemy and get one group to understand the other group’s point of view. Its second objective is to change the thinking of Track One, hopeful that diplomats will become more open on a particular issue, and eventually come to accept Track Two thinking on that particular issue. It is not a substitute, but should be seen as an additional tool, as a supplement. It should not be seen as a threat by Track One, but unfortunately it has been viewed that way, by the State Department in particular. Actually, you have to refer to Track One in the final analysis if you are successful, because official interaction, signing of treaties and documents, and so on, can only take place between governments.

The interest in Track Two has grown enormously in the last decade, particularly in the United States, for two very important reasons. The first is the growing realization that we as a world are not structured to cope with international conflict. In 1987 there were 36 conflicts in the world, in which more than 1,000 people were killed in each conflict. Of those 36 conflicts, 4 are what we call wars or cross-border interactions between two nation-states, like the Iran-Iraq war or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The only external mechanisms available in the world today to bring about the end of a war are through the UN Security Council, and they have a very serious constraint. All of the five permanent members, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and China, have to agree before any item is put on the agenda of the Security Council. Thus, a single permanent member can stop the Council from even talking about any particular conflict. It was through this veto mechanism, for example, that the U.S. prevented any discussion in the Council about the Vietnam war for over ten years. In fact, it took eight years before the Iran-Iraq war was given serious consideration by the Security Council, and it was done then only because the five permanent members agreed to cooperate.

What about those other 32 conflicts, the internal difficulties that exist within member states like Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, the Sudan, and so on down a long list? There is no mechanism in existence today for bringing about a peaceful resolution to such conflicts. The UN Charter absolutely forbids the UN from going into a nation-state, except if invited by that same nation-state. And, of course, in the eyes of that particular nation-state the needs for national sovereignty are supreme. The party in power says that it can
handle the situation, and it usually does so, but through suppression and a total violation of human rights.

The second reason for the growth of interest in this concept of Track Two is the frustration of individuals over what their nation is doing in a particular conflict situation—frustration with the inability of governments to move, or be innovative or imaginative with regards to a particular conflict or policy.

Unfortunately, around the world, beginning with the nation-states themselves, very little attention has been given to these problems, or to this concept of citizen diplomacy. I believe, however, that over the next decade or two, Track Two diplomacy is going to be the informal mechanism which brings about, over time, a peaceful resolution of a number of these internal national conflicts. The growing expansion of Track Two gives reason to be hopeful and optimistic about the future.

Here are five examples of the kind of citizen interaction that is a powerful mover and shaker in today’s world and will be a force for a more peaceful world community in the future. The first example is the work of the National Resources Defense Council. The NRDC is a U.S., private, not-for-profit, citizens’ organization, interested primarily in the concerns of the environment. They were frustrated several years ago by the U.S. government’s adamant refusal to join a nuclear testing moratorium which was begun by the Soviet Union in August of 1985. The rigid U.S. government position was that the moratorium could not be verified, and therefore the matter would not even be discussed with the Soviet Union. The scientists in the NRDC decided to take the resolution of this problem into their own hands. In 1986 they negotiated and signed an agreement with a group of Soviet scientists who were concerned about the same problem. Over the next two years, these two groups set up in the USSR three monitoring stations about 120 miles from the Soviet weapons testing facility. Scientists from both nations operated there for over a year and then moved to this country and set up and jointly staffed three test centers in Nevada. At the end of that two-year period they proved scientifically that their equipment was so sensitive and so sophisticated that they could practically tell when a firecracker went off a mile underground. By this scientific approach they totally destroyed the official U.S. statement that the moratorium was not verifiable. They turned the data over to the U.S. government, and for the first time the U.S. and Soviet governments are talking about this particular issue. This is a very clear example of the power of a small group of Americans and Soviets in changing U.S. national policy.

My second example goes back to the year 1959, when President Eisenhower asked Norman Cousins if there was some way that he could provide an opportunity for Soviet citizens and American citizens, not tied in with their government, to come together and talk about current foreign affairs problems between the two countries. Norman Cousins took on the challenge, and in about 18 months’ time he was able to convince the Russians that this was not a crazy American idea, that there might be something useful to it. They held the first meeting of what is called the Dartmouth College Conference at Dartmouth in 1960. This small group of experts, varying from year to year, eight to ten on each side, have been meeting every year since 1960, talking about particular difficulties between the two superpowers. This interaction has continued irrespective of whether relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were good, bad, or indifferent.
On the citizen side they have been able to maintain their contact, and a number of positive things have come out of this very fine interaction.

The most exciting thing the Dartmouth Conference did was to set up, about eight years ago, a subcommittee which focused on the Middle East. Surprising as it may be, official U.S. policy since the 1967 war in the Middle East was that the Soviet Union had no role in the Middle East. Regardless of administration, for the last 20 years, the official State Department position was that the Soviet Union had no role there, even though it had client states like Libya, Iraq, and Syria. Therefore we would not talk with the Soviet Union about the Middle East. The Dartmouth Conference subcommittee decided that they would try to change this way of thinking. Eight years ago they started meeting two to three times a year, five to six Middle East experts at a time, in Moscow and in Washington. They began a dialogue about policy and foreign affairs issues, which became a powerful force because their connection with Track One, on an informal basis, allowed them to report back into the Track One structure about what they were discussing and how they were interacting. I am convinced that this Dartmouth Conference subgroup, over the years, and the information it provided to the U.S. government, is principally responsible for the total reversal of U.S. policy two years ago when we decided to co-chair a Middle East conference with the Soviet Union. This is a dramatic example of how quiet, behind the scenes, informal interaction can change our government’s thinking.

The third example also deals with the Middle East. It is a brief example, but it shows the difference between Track One and Track Two. During President Carter’s term there was a very fine American expert on the Middle East named Professor Landrum Bolling. From 1976 to 1980, as a private American citizen, he met with Yasir Arafat, the head of the PLO, on a regular basis, two to three days at a time, three to four times a year, for four years. He let summaries of the conversations drift back into the formal Track One structure. During that same time, Ambassador Andrew Young, a close friend of President Carter, who was U.S. ambassador and permanent representative to the UN, had a cup of coffee one afternoon with a member of the PLO observer delegation to the UN, not with Mr. Arafat. The next day he was fired by President Carter. This is a rather dramatic example of the rigidity of Track One and the importance and the power of Track Two. I am convinced that Landrum Bolling’s interaction over the years is primarily responsible for another reversal of U.S. policy in the last months of the Reagan administration. The U.S. government recognized the PLO and had Track One interaction with Mr. Arafat and his representatives for some eighteen months before Mr. Bush closed the door again. This is an example of how an individual can change government thinking.

The next example has to do with the question of terrorism in the world. This, too, was a forbidden subject for discussion between the U.S. and Soviet Union. The U.S. government refused to talk to the Soviets about terrorism for decades. This was basically because Dr. Kissinger had decided some years ago that the Soviet Union was responsible for all terrorism in the world, no matter who did it, and therefore he wouldn’t talk about it. The State Department and other parts of the government were not allowed to discuss this subject with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, on its part, denied the existence of terrorism, so there was no subject to discuss. In April 1989, John
Marks, president of a small nongovernmental organization in Washington, D.C., called Search for Common Ground, decided that he, as a private individual, was going to reverse this concept of not talking about terrorism. He got together a group of 10 Americans who were experts in various facets of terrorism, such as exchange of information, identification of individuals, and communication skills. John took this group to Moscow, where they met with 10 private Soviet experts on terrorism for a whole week, developing a trust relationship, trying to get to know each other, trying to learn what the barriers of communication were, and then talking about the specific subject. To the surprise of everybody on the American side, it turned out that the Soviets really needed help from the U.S. They finally announced that in the previous four years, 70 Soviet citizens had been murdered by terrorists in nonwar zones in various parts of the Soviet Union and around the world, information that had never been released before. The Soviets wanted help to go about solving some of these issues.

The doors were opened, and a second meeting was agreed upon. It took place in October 1989, at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California. Again there were 10 people from each side, this time moving a little closer to Track One. On the U.S. delegation was Bill Colby, former CIA Director under Reagan, and also Ray Klein, former Deputy Director of the CIA. Among the 10 on the Soviet side, there were two KGB generals, who retired the week before they went to California. Both of them had been involved in anti-terrorist activities for some years, and one of them actually had been the number-two man in the KGB. Building on the trust relationship started in Moscow, they began to look at what they could do to help each other. The group ended that one-week meeting by signing a document with 21 recommendations for national action on the part of both parties. They turned this document over to their respective governments and urged that this kind of communication should be continued and strengthened.

In August of 1990, the third meeting took place in Moscow. The U.S. government was not yet prepared to take a Track One role, but the Soviets were. They had several serving KGB generals on their delegation. The word was getting out that some exciting things were happening here, so terrorist experts from the U.K., France, Italy, and Ireland became a part of this scene, talking about how one can cope with the terrors of terrorism. The next meeting is supposed to take place this summer [1991], and I expect that by that time it will be a formal Track One situation and that the various recommendations that have been initialed and signed informally will be adopted formally by the two governments. [In fact, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev discussed terrorism specifically at the July ’91 Summit in Moscow.]

One man, John Marks, started this process, and in two years proved that you can take on your own government and even another government, two superpowers in this instance, and change the thinking of both of them. This is a powerful example of how, through communication, we can bring about a more peaceful world.

The last example has to do with the Iowa Peace Institute and conflict resolution skills. The Institute decided to do something, as a nonprofit organization from central Iowa, in the Soviet Union. We invited a speaker from the U.S.-Canadian Institute in Moscow, part of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, to come to our offices in Grinnell. Together with him, two other small groups in the U.S., and three groups in the Soviet
Union, we worked out an agreement to sign a letter of intent to create, over a four-year period, a Soviet-American center for conflict resolution in Moscow. To put that in context, consider that the Soviet Union only has used force as the means of resolving conflict over the last thousand years. We were very pleased and surprised when we signed this letter of intent. We were even more surprised when, in October of 1989, I was called by Moscow with an invitation to come over right away, because they did not want to wait for another year or two. Four of us went to Moscow at the end of October 1989, for 10 days. We interacted with dozens of groups of Soviets in the Moscow area, all of them fascinated by what we were talking about.

The word “mediation” does not exist in the Russian language. Mediation and a “win-win” philosophy were brand new ideas we were bringing to the fore, so we were very pleased when the press, radio, and television found out about what we were doing and covered us on their networks. We wanted to get the word out as broadly as possible about this idea of resolving conflict peacefully because nonviolent resolution of conflict was something the Soviet people had never experienced. At the end of the 10-day period we actually signed an agreement, an international treaty so to speak, between various organizations, creating a Soviet-American Center on Conflict Resolution. They invited us to come back as soon as we could. We went back in March of 1990, with a team of nine people, set up four simultaneous training sessions, and trained over one hundred Soviet citizens in conflict resolution skills, the first such training in the history of that country.

The four tracks were very interesting. In the first were 35 members from the trade union movement. When we decided to work with trade unions, we specified that we also wanted some members of the Soviet Strike Committee, the new movement in the labor field. Among those 35 were 10 strikers who had been coal miners at the pit head a few months earlier, and had actually gone on strike for the first time in the history of the Soviet Union. It was a fascinating opportunity to interact with them as individuals as part of that training process.

We then trained 20 teachers in the same skills, techniques, and principles taught in a very dramatic program we have done here in Iowa. We brought the trainers that we had worked with in Iowa to Moscow, and trained primary and secondary school teachers in the Moscow system how to teach their students that there are ways to solve conflict other than beating each other up on the playground.

The third group consisted of 35 psychologists and sociologists. Nothing has been written in the Russian language about conflict resolution. They wanted to set up their own center and wanted to get involved in research, so we discussed conflict resolution theory. Those people have now set up their own research center, and I received a letter two weeks ago from one of them. She said that week changed her life, because she learned new skills and is taking a whole new direction in life.

The fourth track were 20 personnel directors and psychologists from the nuclear power plant industry. After Chernobyl there was a wave of anger, fear, and frustration that swept through the rest of that industry. We received a specific request from the Moscow organizers that we find U.S. experts who could conduct this training.

We then went to Warsaw, where we had signed an agreement with the University of
Warsaw and the Ministry of Education, and trained 50 Poles in those same skills.

These examples of Track Two diplomacy in action give an idea of how it is possible for individuals and small groups, including a small, not-for-profit institute from Iowa, to bring about changes in world affairs. The message is that individuals are far more powerful than they give themselves credit for. An individual has power, and a group has even more power. Individuals can bring about, through their own personal actions, a more peaceful world.
Assessing the Impact of Peace Building Processes

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Abstract

A new emphasis in social scientists’ study of international peace calls for positive, proactive programs that promote peace building, rather than negative, reactive programs intended to reduce violence. Peace building focuses on promoting harmony, understanding, and effective problem solving. Peace building skills—cultural self-awareness, intercultural communication, and problem solving—could be enhanced through reconstructed negotiations involving diplomats and culturally contrasting role-players. Evaluation of such training programs would include a three part assessment and feedback design utilizing a constructivist approach, in which the designer and the trainees would participate. Modifying and transferring assessment methods into real world negotiations would involve interviews and discussions with international negotiators before, during and after negotiations to advise on any changes along with specific behaviors and communications associated with them. The focus of this assessment would be on near-term outcomes of negotiations, and long-term consequences in the development of social organizations, social programs, and international meetings and negotiations, all aimed at finding creative solutions to common problems in international relations.
Introduction

There has been a new emphasis in the approach of social scientists to the study of international peace. A few quotes will illustrate some common themes that led to this changed emphasis.

Dr. Serge King (1990):

If you put your focus on things the way you would like them to be, or on the good aspects of those things you don’t particularly like, that’s what you strengthen and in a sense, legitimize; on the contrary, if you keep putting your attention on and resisting what you don’t like, you weaken yourself and strengthen it, because energy flows where attention goes. Thus, the more you hate war and those who execute war, the more strength and energy you endow it with; and the more you weaken yourself and make yourself less effective to change things. (p. 1)

Dr. David Edwards (1990):

Most social theories . . . tend to be theories of conflict and violence rather than of their reduction. . . . even when social theories are developed by theorists who consider their work “peace research” and are explicitly committed to creating a more peaceful world, if [their] theories are theories of war, arms racing, conflict escalation, intergroup hostility, or other socially deleterious phenomena . . . [they] legitimate the behavior to which causal efficacy is being attributed . . . and disempower the audience. (p. 9)

Dr. Paul Kimmel (1984):

Most Western social scientists follow the logical-empiricist approach which assumes that their concepts and techniques will eventually produce a “true” understanding of the phenomena that they are studying. This “normal science approach” limits their observations, analyses, and conclusions to those that are acceptable in their subculture and their larger national cultures. There is much to recommend the normal science approach within a given culture, especially when that culture includes many of the values undergirding this approach, but the belief that such an approach will arrive at “truths” and its corollary that these “truths” will be universal, has negative implications for international and intercultural studies. (p. 5)

Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace Building

I distinguish between three different approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building. Peacekeeping is predominantly peace enforcing. Peacemaking utilizes international negotiation to try to resolve existing conflicts, reduce violence, and create negotiated settlements. Peace building is a new concept, and I would like to use an analogy from medicine to illustrate it in reference to the other two.

Peacekeeping is essentially quarantine. Imagine there is an epidemic of bubonic plague running wild worldwide. We do not yet have a remedy, but we must do something to stop it from spreading. So we physically isolate nations and individuals from each other, in the hope that at least we will keep things from getting worse. This is primarily the function of the UN peacekeeping troops.

At a more sophisticated level, medicine develops inoculation procedures and vaccines to be able to prevent or at least forestall the disease. Setting up a medical estab-
lishment is much like the negotiation establishment we have in Track One diplomacy. Peacemaking, as it is currently practiced, is preventive to some extent, remedial to a great extent.

Peace building is like wellness building: concerted efforts to educate people to change their diets, to exercise, to engage in activities that will strengthen their cardiovascular, immune, and other systems and make them healthier. Wellness building is not a reactive approach to disease, it is a proactive approach to creating health. In a similar manner, peace building places an emphasis on what can be done in the international community to promote harmony, understanding, and effective problem solving.

International Negotiation

In a paper presented at the 1990 meeting of the American Psychological Association in Boston, I encouraged members of the newly formed Division of Peace Psychology to devote their energies to proactive peace efforts rather than reactive anti-war activities. I suggested that these psychologists study the international processes of building relationships and social structures that promote problem solving for the mutual benefit and security of all when situations of conflict arise. International negotiations (defined as “the deliberate interaction of two or more complex social units attempting to define the terms of their interdependence”) are primary examples of such processes. In my own study of international negotiation at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), I found that negotiators who understand their own subjective cultures and are willing to learn about the subjective cultures of those with whom they are negotiating, are more likely to reduce misunderstandings and to facilitate the search for mutually acceptable solutions in international meetings. The relationships they form while collaborating on international problems may in turn ameliorate or avert other conflicts based on misunderstandings and promote international agreements that lead to trust among the negotiators and eventually among their nations.

Two obstacles that have hampered our efforts to understand and contribute to such international negotiations and the less violent world that they can engender are an insistence on the normal science approach and a search for universals in human behavior across cultures. A great deal has been written about the limitations of positivistic approaches to the study of human behavior. To create the new ways of thinking that are needed in our nuclear world, we social scientists must be willing to explore approaches and methodologies other than those of normal science (such as those of constructivist inquiry and fourth generation evaluation) in both our research and education efforts (please refer to p. 131; also Lincoln & Guba, 1985; and Guba & Lincoln, 1989). To assist people in situations of conflict to behave productively, we must help them see that there are a multitude of ways of thinking, feeling, reasoning, and communicating with each other. We can best help others realize their own potential and value the contributions of others as we become more aware of our own blinders and the limitations of our cultural perspectives and ideologies.
Illustrations of the Need for International Understanding

I would like to give two examples of this. In the early 60s Nikita Khrushchev visited this country and, among other things, came here to Iowa where he visited a farm and looked at corn production. At the General Assembly of the United Nations he gained notoriety for taking off his shoe and pounding it on the table, as well as making some very loud remarks in reaction to some of the speakers. At the end of that session, he himself made a speech, and at the end of that speech Mr. Khrushchev raised his arms above his head and said, through an interpreter, “We will bury you.”

What did Nikita Khrushchev mean by that? As Americans, the press and other observers assumed he was signaling victory. In the U.S., that nonverbal gesture indicates that “I won.” Political candidates do this all the time. Prizefighters, after they’ve knocked somebody down, and football players in the end zone after a scoring a touchdown, make this same gesture.

However, that is not the meaning of that gesture in the Soviet Union, particularly in Georgia, from where Nikita Khrushchev came. Best translated into our own gestures, it is like extending the hand, as one would do in an introduction or to indicate the desire to get acquainted. Not knowing this, we are going to follow what is known in psychology as the attribution process—to attribute to Nikita Khrushchev what an American would mean.

If Khrushchev meant to indicate by his gesture, “We would like to get to know you,” why did he say, “We will bury you”? Is it simply a bad translation? Certainly there are bad translations in international negotiations, and we get some very unusual statements coming through our interpreters. However, assuming that it was not, could he have meant that the Soviet Union is going to militaristically defeat the United States? That was the assumption of the journalists and the other Americans who saw and heard those remarks. That was not, according to my source, who was one of the chief interpreters at that conference, his intention.

Khrushchev’s intention was to talk in terms of dialectical materialism, the theory and practice that Marxists have used for years in the Soviet Union, which assumes that capitalism will die, will wither away as they like to say. At that point, dialectical materialism, Marxism, will take over, and their system will then replace capitalism as the dominant economic system in the world. That system then will bury the capitalist system.

If we want to take a very kind interpretation of that, we can assume it is like telling your grandfather, who does not have enough money for a coffin and a funeral service, that you will bury him. If we want to take a more harsh interpretation, we can say it is like telling our competitor in business that when he fails, we will make sure that he gets a decent burial, that is, we will take care of his customers after he is gone. But in any case, it does not necessarily mean militaristic action.

A more recent example of this comes from the conflict with Iraq and a meeting that took place in Geneva between the American Secretary of State, James Baker, and Iraq’s foreign minister. This meeting certainly did not represent a negotiation even in the Track One sense of the term. Both sides communicated inadequately in an atmosphere of anger and confusion. The Iraqis felt that proper protocol had been breached when they were given a letter peremptorily and told what they had to do regarding the negotiations. The Americans were astounded by the fact that the letter, coming from an
American diplomat, was rejected. I was not astounded, and, in fact, that is just what I would have predicted would happen with any Middle Eastern diplomat, if a letter were given peremptorily without first meeting or developing some kind of relationship.

**A Training Program for Negotiators**

I believe that the most valuable lessons that we can impart through our research, training, and assessment efforts are the notions of learned cultural differences and the value of cultural self-awareness. The notion that everyone potentially has something to offer in the management of conflicts, and that no position or approach is absolutely best, is crucial to peace building. In the monograph that I am writing about my USIP study, I have detailed the stages of cultural self-awareness in the individual and a training program to assist international negotiators in developing their own awareness and understanding of cultural differences. I would assess the impact of such training on the individual negotiators, on the negotiations in which they are later involved, and on the broader processes of building relationships and social structures that promote problem solving for mutual benefit and security (peace building). These assessments would not analytically isolate and measure abstract traits or processes (such as empathy, flexibility, or moral reasoning) as a normal science approach might, but, in keeping with the new emphasis on research and evaluation that I have suggested, would look idiosyncratically at specific contexts in which specific individual behaviors make a difference.

The training of international negotiators that I have proposed involves simulations of specific negotiations in which they have been involved. These simulations would be tailored to each trainee, with the significant difference from the actual negotiation being the other negotiator. In the training program, this negotiator (trainer) would be an actor trained to present perceptions, behaviors, and communications that contrast culturally with those of the trainee. After the simulations, the trainees would be guided through a discussion of their experiences with an emphasis on their motivations and those of the actor (perceived). The actor would then return for a similar discussion and an interview by the trainee. Finally, the trainees would examine the values and assumptions underlying their behavior and perceptions, and those of the actor.

**Assessment of the Training Program**

To assess the impact of this training on the individual international negotiators, I would observe the behavior, perceptions, and communication of the trainee in subsequent simulations or negotiations. This would be done in three different contexts. First, the trainee would be asked to comment on an edited video of the original simulation. She or he would describe the intent or meaning of several of the behaviors and communications of the actor. Some of these would be repeats of behaviors discussed in the debriefing of the simulation, others would be different. A measure of the impact of the simulation and debriefing would be the change in isomorphism of the trainee’s assessments and the actor’s actual intentions (what we will call accuracy).

Second, the trainee would be asked to take part in other simulations of different negotiations with the same and/or different actors. The impact of the first simulation
and its debriefing would be assessed during the subsequent simulations by observing the extent to which the trainee can more accurately communicate to the actor his or her intentions and feelings and understand the intentions and feelings of the actor.

A third measure of impact would be the accuracy of the trainee’s assessments of the actor’s intentions and perceptions in the debriefings of the subsequent negotiations and in the analyses of the edited videos of these simulations. The assumption, of course, is that after taking part in one simulation and debriefing, the trainee’s analytic and communications skills will improve (as seen from the perspective of the actor).

Assessment of Subsequent Negotiations

This training program would be an easy environment in which to assess the impact of attempts to improve international negotiation skills. Here we have more control of the scenario and videos of the negotiation processes. The real world of negotiation is much more complex and much less accessible to observation and videotaping. In such situations, the assessment strategies of constructivist inquiry and fourth generation evaluation are especially relevant. The emphasis in this descriptive, ethnographic approach is on reconstructing an event from the viewpoints of those involved. This “naturalistic” approach to assessment is designed to develop context- and time-bound descriptions and working hypotheses that are joint or collaborative reconstructions of all the parties involved in the inquiry. There is no search for generalizations that are context-, time-, or value-free as there is in the positivist paradigm of normal science. The evaluators state in advance their value orientations and interact with the individuals being evaluated to systematically and empirically reconstruct the impact of a program. The evaluator is a reflective actor in the reflexive social reality of the assessment process.

In training programs such as mine, the designer of the program should also be involved in the assessment process. The reason for this is apparent in the three assessments described above, since these assessments are a part of the training itself. When the assessment is of a real world negotiation involving one or more of the trainees, the reasoning is less obvious. Indeed, the conventional wisdom of the normal science approach indicates that the evaluation should not be undertaken by those involved in the training, but by an “independent” third party so there is “no bias” in the assessment.

The constructivist paradigm argues, however, that there are no neutral, unbiased or independent third parties. Social reality is fundamentally indeterminate and all social scientists will bring their social constructs and values to bear on whatever they assess. (What often passes for neutrality or impartiality is usually a position that is in keeping with the social status quo.) If one accepts the constructivist paradigm, it becomes apparent that the more sophisticated and informed the evaluators are about the programs they are assessing, the more likely they are to promote an isomorphic reconstruction of the social impact of that program in their evaluation. In addition, the designer of a training program like mine—which stresses self-awareness and insight into the cultural values and assumptions that underlie trainees’ behaviors, feelings, and perceptions—must be sensitive to his or her own values and assumptions and capable of explicating them to those he or she is training and evaluating. Therefore, I believe that a good case can be made for including myself in all of the assessments of the impact of this training pro-
gram, as long as I follow the systematic and replicable procedures of fourth generation evaluation. The social role of assessor will contribute to my work as program developer in that I will be regularly receiving feedback about the program from those most affected by it.

At the level of real world negotiations, this feedback will come primarily from interviews and discussions with the international negotiators involved in these negotiations. To ascertain whether they have become more collaborative, developed trust and respect for each other, found common ground on which more of their beliefs, values and assumptions are negotiable, and are perceived by other negotiators as understanding and gracious (outcomes and processes that would be expected from the training) will require both individual and group conversations. These conversations would occur at several points before, during, and after the negotiations to reconstruct not only any changes, but also the specific behaviors and communications associated with them.

In addition to assessing the impact of the previous training program on the negotiators and providing information that would improve the development of future training programs, this constructivist inquiry would also empower the negotiators in the real world negotiation and affect their behaviors and communications in their meetings. As Guba and Lincoln (1989) point out, fourth generation evaluation is a teaching/learning process in which all stakeholders, including the evaluator(s), teach and learn from each other. Since the primary goal of my training program is helping the negotiators to learn how to learn during their future negotiations, fourth generation evaluation is entirely compatible with my training and, indeed, can be seen as an integral aspect of it.

Assessment of Peace Building

In evaluating the impact of these real world negotiations (which involve individuals trained and/or assessed by me) on the broader processes of building relationships and social structures that promote problem solving for mutual benefit and security (what I have called peace building), I am interested in two different levels of reconstruction: the near-term outcomes of the negotiations themselves and the longer-range implications of these outcomes and of the behaviors of the negotiators for their countries and the world. In looking at the outcomes, I am interested both in the “solutions” the negotiators create to the problems facing them and in any changes that occur in their relationships with each other and with their constituents. In my monograph, I suggest that culturally sensitive and skilled negotiators can create hybrid solutions that could not have been created by the individuals acting independently or without increased cultural sensitivity. To test these working hypotheses, I would look at the solutions generated in negotiations involving the trained negotiators and compare these with the solutions to similar (current or past) problems arrived at by untrained negotiators. The criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the different solutions would be a pragmatic one: which of the solutions

1 The fourth generation evaluator must “act not only as the technician who facilitates the process but as an active participant who shapes the product as well. . . . in fourth generation evaluation, the evaluator is a key figure in a process that creates a new and more sophisticated ‘reality’ that has built into it direct and immediate implications for action” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 262).
are accepted by the countries involved and which of these in turn are most successful in managing conflicts and precluding violence?

The implications of the training and negotiations for the countries of the negotiators would be assessed by looking at how officials and the public responded to and implemented the solutions proposed by their negotiators. While immediate reactions of the government, the media and the public are important and therefore would be measured by standard survey research techniques, I am more interested in the longer-term implications of the negotiated outcomes and of the relationships formed by the negotiators. To what extent do these contribute to peace building?

Peace building takes place through social organizations and relationships that can deal with the conflicts, stresses, and frustrations that are inevitable in international relations without resorting to violent behavior and war. Fourth generation evaluations will be very difficult to conduct at the international level of peace building due to the variety and number of stakeholders and the long time-spans involved. However, it should be possible to conduct evaluations of this type in each of the negotiators’ countries to reconstruct and promote the beginnings of the social processes that lead to the social organizations and relationships associated with peace building. These evaluations would be sociopolitical processes in keeping with constructivist inquiry.2 They would also be local assessments as their outcomes would depend on local contexts, local informants and stakeholders, and local values and assumptions. Each of these evaluations would be undertaken separately and would elicit and take into account political input in the local reconstructions of a wide range of stakeholders. These reconstructions should include the social, economic, and cultural changes that have come from the negotiations, as well as the political impacts.

The longer-term consequences of these peace building efforts will be seen internationally in the development of social organizations like the Nordic Council, the EEC, and Cooperation North in Ireland; in social programs like the German Marshall Fund, the Good Neighbors, Sister Cities and Partners; and in the proliferation of international meetings and negotiations designed to find creative solutions to common problems. Again at the international level, you will notice that the focus of my assessments are on the positive, constructive, and collaborative aspects of international relations. In keeping with Serge King’s advice at the beginning of my talk, these are what I seek to create and legitimize through my training program and fourth generation evaluations. Of course, I am interested in increases or decreases in violent behaviors and events such as crimes, accidents, and wars, but these are not the focus of my work. I expect a decrease in the resort to violence by individuals and negotiators in international relationships and social structures that promote peace building. I choose to support and develop these individuals through training and assessment programs that encourage peace building behavior, rather than working on eliminating international behaviors I do not like such as coercion and war.

2 “Social, cultural and political aspects, far from being merely distracting or distorting nuisances, are integral to the process, at least as important as are considerations of technical adequacy” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 263).
Summary

I have suggested that it is important for those interested in contributing to a stable world peace to focus their attention and work on positive, proactive programs that will promote peace building rather than negative, reactive programs intended to reduce violence. I have discussed briefly such a program of training for international negotiators. I have shown how this program will develop self-awareness and intercultural communication skills that will enable these negotiators to better understand and collaborate with each other in future negotiations. I have proposed a constructivist approach for the assessment of these training programs and the subsequent negotiations that will create additional understanding and collaboration among the trainees and those with whom they negotiate.

I have also suggested that these informed negotiations will have an impact on the peace building efforts of the negotiators and their constituencies through the development of relationships and social structures that promote problem solving for the mutual benefit and security of all when situations of conflict arise. I proposed that these peace building efforts can be assessed both by conventional survey research techniques in the near term and by constructivist inquiry within countries. International assessment will be more difficult, but should be possible if the focus of the assessments is on development and accomplishments of cooperative international organizations, programs, meetings, and negotiations.

References


Discussion

John Davies, Center for International Development and Conflict Management. It is a pleasure to hear from both Ambassador McDonald and Dr. Kimmel, both of whom are leaders in the field of pioneering international negotiations away from the old, static Track One structural concept that has been holding us back for so long. What we hear in both of these talks is the need to move from this static structure to a system we trust and take pride in. But at the same time we tend to interpret other systems in terms of our own; we tend to reduce others’ world view, others’ sense of values, into terms of our own, and thereby we lose the integrity of the other perspective: we fail to communicate.

So the need is to take up the task of moving from that structural, static perspective to a dynamic world view where development and constant change are seen as the basis for security, the basis for peace.

Dr. Azar, who founded the center where I am working at the moment, and who is a close colleague of Ambassador McDonald, has pointed out that peace is development. There is no other basis for peace than development. Development in the broader sense—individual, social, ontological, economical, political—all values of development are essential to peace. Peace cannot be found through defending any particular world view or system in its own right. The system has to be open to constant change, adaptation, and growth if peace is going to be assured.

So if we resist change and try to maintain the status quo, development becomes impossible. It is inviting our own destruction. If we don’t move forward, then by definition, we are moving backward. If we are not creating, by definition, we are destroying—ourselves and others.

The same concept of development applies to the individual level. The current changes in collective consciousness on a global level have precipitated the need to move from the perspective of formal operations to give way to much more dynamic or dialectical thinking, based on what Maharishi calls the heart, where the process is not of defining or building one world view but being flexible enough to appreciate different, mutually exclusive but internally consistent world views. We need to appreciate other cultures and world views without imposing our own on theirs, without rejecting theirs if it doesn’t conform to ours. Such openness allows both cultures to be enriched, an interchange that leads to and promotes mutual development and mutual support. This is what has been referred to as positive-sums solutions—where the mutual process of change can lead to mutual satisfaction of needs of both parties—as opposed to zero-sum solutions, based on competition for and exploitation of the material resources of the environment.

It is heartening to see a movement towards this common goal in all the different approaches to peace that have been discussed during the conference, including creating coherence in collective consciousness, promotion of development, Track Two diplomacy, and other approaches to building a broader understanding between different cultures.

David Orme-Johnson, Maharishi International University. People often may feel helpless when confronted with the enormously complicated problems of the world, but an interesting point that Ambassador McDonald brought out was that, as individuals, we
can do something about the world. As he illustrated, the individual often has the freedom to do things that governments cannot do. Our understanding of this from Maharishi’s theory of collective consciousness is that governments are the innocent mirror of the collective consciousness, and the collective consciousness directs the government to act in this way or that. Stresses in the collective consciousness direct the government to act ineffectively and inappropriately, similar to stresses in individual consciousness.

Maharishi illustrates this principle on the simplest level of collective consciousness—family consciousness. The father is the head of the collective consciousness of a family, and he may have the intention to give his son something really good or do something for him, but if the son doesn’t deserve it, if he is acting like a rascal, in his role as head of the collective consciousness of the family, the father cannot act in the way he would like to act. The role that he has taken dictates that he act in a certain way—he is compelled to discipline his son. Like that, when a person steps into a national office, he or she becomes the head of the collective consciousness and must move according to the dictates of the collective consciousness. We have had, in fact, heads of state privately acknowledge when discussing this principle, that they often have felt that they should do this thing or that, but somehow they were not able to: something held them back from doing it, even though they knew it was the right thing to do. Individual citizens, on the other hand, are not so much in the focal point of the collective consciousness as government leaders, and have much greater freedom and can do things that government offices cannot do.

I believe, on the basis of our research, that the most powerful thing the individual can do is to practice the Transcendental Meditation and TM-Sidhi program to create coherence in collective consciousness. Our daily group meditations at Maharishi International University are a type of citizen diplomacy.

Moreover, we feel our group meditations contribute to all other types of citizen diplomacy by helping to empower the individual through creating more coherence in collective consciousness, which improves communication between people. Collective consciousness is influenced by the individuals in society, and if they are stressed and not in touch with that source of peace and infinite correlation, the level of perfect communication within themselves, then society is more chaotic, fragmented, violent, and uncommunicative.

If you have enough people stimulating that level of infinite correlation within themselves, it is as if everyone in society is meditating. Everyone’s awareness is reconnected to this more integrated level of consciousness, and consequently, they are better able to see other people’s points of view and to communicate effectively. All efforts of peace-makers everywhere are enhanced when coherence in collective consciousness is increased. We see this repeatedly in the Maharishi Effect research, when looking at variables such as statements from heads of state and the current state of ongoing conflict resolution negotiation. The research shows that when the coherence-creating groups are assembled, the statements of heads of state become more positive, responsible, and cooperative. Ceasefires are called and honored, and negotiations, which were going on all the time, suddenly begin to work like a miracle. And when the groups disperse,
things return to a more chaotic, nonharmonious state.

I resonated with many points in both Ambassador McDonald’s and Dr. Kimmel’s talks. Both of them mentioned that communication, knowing what the other person’s intentions are, knowing their point of view, is really the key to peace. And when communication becomes perfect, there is no conflict. Conflict really means that there is lack of communication.

From the perspective of Maharishi’s Vedic Science and Technology, the basis of the human mind and society is a level of infinite correlation, pure consciousness, which underlies all the active levels of thought. This is the source of integration of all those thoughts, a level of unbounded awareness and perfect self-referral communication.

This is a very optimistic point of view, because it states that within every human being is, in fact, the source of peace. Peace is not just an option, it is not relativistic; it is basic to life, it is, in fact, the most basic aspect of life. When we see that the world has been living in nonpeace throughout recorded history, according to our understanding, the reason is that the technology for systematically cultivating contact of the individual mind with that source of infinite correlation and perfect peace within each individual has been missing. Such a means was around at one time, and now has been rediscovered. In light of what Ambassador McDonald and Dr. Kimmel spoke about, the individuals that are able to see the other person’s point of view are naturally the more peaceful individuals in the world, who are spontaneously on such a high level of evolution that they are in contact with that source of peace within themselves.

Dr. Kimmel talked about the principle of putting attention on that which we like, and Dr. Markides made a similar comment regarding her exercises to visualize peace. Maharishi also emphasizes that particular point. A principle of Vedic psychology is “that to which you give your attention grows stronger in your life.” Our understanding is that our lives are structures of consciousness which become codified in our physiology, depending upon how we allocate our attention. For example, when you learn something new, you are learning to deploy your attention in certain ways, and then that becomes part of your life. If you don’t know how to ride a bicycle, you put your attention on this and on that, and when you first learn it, it is very attention intensive; you have to put your attention on each part sequentially, and then it becomes unitized and automatic; it becomes part of your life. Like that, throughout our lives, depending on how we deploy our attention, that is how our lives become. To get a Ph.D. in a particular area, we put our attention through a whole sequence of courses, and that is what we become. So if we want a peaceful world, we certainly want to deploy our attention on creating a positive, dynamic peace.