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Maharishi Vedic Science


Huang, Ayako (Hsin-Ling)
The licensing deal is an organizational phenomenon to the extent that it exhibits relational features. These deals are governed by both contractual behaviors that are regulated through the “black letter” of the deal and non-contractual behaviors that are guided by social
norms. Understanding more about norms, implicit obligations, and other relational features, and the nature of social relationships that structure behavior in licensing would allow us to motivate the behaviors in supporting partnership and reduce opportunism.

This dissertation focuses on the interrelations between economic activities (especially technology transfer), individual status in various domains (political, economic, social), and inter-firm relationships. Results indicate that standard views of negotiating the licensing contract are inadequate. That is, economists have no language with which to explain “appropriate” behavior. This is strictly a sociological concept. March (1999)
distinguished the economic and sociological perspectives by saying that economists explain behavior using a “logic of consequence,” referring to the effects of an action in relation to one’s preferences, whereas sociologists explain behavior in terms of a “logic of appropriateness,” in which action can be justified on the grounds that it is expected in the context of a person’s role, social position, or background. It is this expectation, or more
precisely a common expectation, that defines a norm.

Evidence from this research demonstrates that social norms provide the solution to technology transfer problems, especially in cases where standard models of rationalthe contract itself. Behaviors under licensing contracts rely more on social norrns than on legal rights and duties. In particular, social norrns are most relevant and effective when the deals involve amendment.


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